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ARTICLES
OUTLAW SPEECH ON THE INTERNET:
EXAMINING THE LINK BETWEEN UNIQUE
CHARACTERISTICS OF ONLINE MEDIA AND
CRIMINAL LIBEL PROSECUTIONS
Edward L. Carter, Esq.t
ABSTRACT
Criminal libel prosecutions have been relatively rare since the
United States Supreme Court expounded new constitutional standards
for state criminal libel laws in Garrison v. Louisiana, in 1964. The
rise of the Internet, however, in the mid-1990s coincided with a
modest increase in the number of threatened and actual prosecutions
for speech. About one-third of the recent criminal libel cases,
including the notable prosecution of a Utah high school student,
involved Internet speech. In examining the role played by the unique
characteristics of the Internet in recent criminal libel cases, this article
concludes that online speech justifies greater-if not absolute-
protection from libel prosecution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Somewhere in America a 16-year-old male high school student
with green and pink hair is angry because a more popular teen has
publicly called his girlfriend a "slut." In a crowded school hallway,
the 16-year-old shouts that the other boy's girlfriend is also a "slut."
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The incident invariably unlocks the boy's pent-up frustrations with
high school life. He directs his anger not only at classmates, but also
at school administrators and teachers. Chafing under the iron-fisted
rule of his school's principal, with whom he has had frequent run-ins
and even physical altercations, the pink-and-green-haired boy yells
loudly that the principal is a "drunk" and a "dickhead" who is having
an affair with the school secretary. The boy then accuses a male
teacher of homosexual conduct and calls a female staff member a
"bitch."
What punishment could the 16-year-old expect for his behavior?
Suspension perhaps, or maybe expulsion, but only if school
authorities could show that the boy's words or actions "materially
disrupt[ed] classwork or involve[d] substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others" sufficient to overcome the boy's First
Amendment right to speak.'
Suppose, however, the 16-year-old boy had instead bitten his
tongue in the school hallway but, quietly seething, hatched a plan to
publish an off-campus newspaper to express his feelings. The boy
used a home computer to craft various satirical articles about his
classmates, teachers, and principal-repeating the same vulgar
accusations mentioned above. The newspaper then was distributed
generally throughout town, but not at school, although the 16-year old
left an anonymous note in a school classroom that disclosed an off-
campus location where copies of the publication could be obtained.
What punishment could the boy now expect from school authorities?
Because of the First Amendment, school officials under this scenario
could not punish him at all:
We may not permit school administrators to seek approval of the
community-at-large by punishing students for expression that took
place off school property. Nor may courts endorse such
punishment because the populace would approve. The First
Amendment will not abide the additional chill on protected
expression that would inevitably emanate from such a practice.
Indeed, experience teaches that future communications would be
inhibited regardless of the intentions of well meaning school
officials. 2
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). The Court
stated "that [n]either students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
2. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir.
1979) (reversing a school administrator's decision to suspend four junior high school students
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In this scenario, suppose instead that the boy's off-campus
newspaper were an online newspaper, created at the boy's home,
whereby only a note left in a school classroom disclosed the World
Wide Web address where the newspaper could be located. What
punishment could the boy expect? School officials still can't punish
him because he created the online publication after school and with
the use of a home computer,3 but somehow the added dimension of
the Internet in this scenario fuels the community to act and do strange
things that would not necessarily have occurred in the previous
situations.4 Here, even after the school's principal has filed a civil
defamation lawsuit, he and the community still aren't satisfied that
the boy has learned his lesson: they want more. Parents and school
officials become involved and convince the local county prosecutor to
seek a criminal remedy. They have the boy arrested, jailed, and
prosecuted for criminal libel. In the end, the boy is run out of town
and told never to return. Sound unlikely? Unlikely, yes, but that
exact scenario nevertheless took place in a rural Utah community in
2000.
The case of 16-year-old Ian Lake,5 the boy with pink and green
hair, demonstrates some of the dangers posed by remaining criminal
libel laws. Although most states' criminal libel laws were
legislatively repealed or judicially struck down in the latter part of the
20th century, criminal libel in the age of the Internet could rise again
and become a powerful tool in the hands of government officials
seeking to punish unpopular or minority speech. Such prosecutions
would have the greatest impact on teenagers and the indigent, whose
lack of financial assets would make them judgment proof in a civil
defamation lawsuit. Although the number of Internet criminal libel
cases thus far has been relatively small, the very real prospect of
speakers-including journalists-facing criminal prosecution for
mere alleged defamatory online words merits assessment of whether
for five days each for publishing an off-campus newspaper that included articles on
masturbation, prostitution, sodomy, and castration).
3. Emily Wax, Censored Students Post Their Exposds Online, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
2000, at B 1 (taking note of "[s]everal court rulings [that] have declared that the Internet is
outside the reach of school officials").
4. Katharine Biele, When Students Get Hostile, Teachers Go to Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 22, 2000, at I ("The Web has added a new dimension to the issue of teacher
defamation, taking what were once lunch-table conversations or clandestine notes, and making
them available to everyone.").
5. In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002).
2005)
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the unique characteristics of the Internet justify different legal
standards than those applicable to other media.6
This article examines Internet criminal libel cases to identify
unique characteristics of the World Wide Web that may have led to
more speech-restrictive legal treatment than would have been present
with non-Internet speech. I conclude that the unique characteristics of
the Internet as a medium of expression justify fewer, not more, speech
restrictions than those present in other mass communication media.
Characteristics of the Internet such as decentralization and anonymity
do not provide reasons for law enforcement officials to prosecute or
threaten to prosecute Internet libels more vigorously than non-Internet
libels. Rather, characteristics such as low entry barriers, long shelf
life and wide reach actually provide reasons for more vigorously
protecting Internet speech than non-Internet speech.
II. CRIMINAL LIBEL IN AMERICA
Americans once considered criminal prosecution of libels
necessary to prevent duels and other breaches of the peace.7 By the
late 20th century, however, criminal libel had been virtually
eradicated. Free speech advocates and news organizations argued that
any harm stemming from libel was better addressed in civil and not
criminal courts.8 Imprisoning speakers, they said, "is completely
antithetic[al] to current law and the public conscience, which
encourages a robust discussion on matters of public interest." 9 The
notion that a person in 21st century America could be jailed for
speech' seemed strange enough that one journalist compared it to
6. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (noting that the Intemet-because it
did not suffer from medium scarcity and was not as invasive as radio or television-was entitled
to greater speech freedom than broadcast media).
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Ivey
v. State, 836 So. 2d 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (No. CR 99-2322), available at
http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/iveyala.html#1 (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
Brief].
8. Repeal Criminal Defamation, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 24, 2002, at AA1 ('Rectifying
the harms caused by defamation is best achieved through a civil suit for damages by the
individual maligned, not a criminal prosecution and incarceration at taxpayer expense.").
9. Brief, supra note 7.
10. The United States Supreme Court has identified several narrow categories of speech
that can be subject to prohibition or punishment despite the First Amendment. For example, the
Court has long maintained that speech advocating imminent lawless action is not protected. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."). But cf Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128
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"using an atomic bomb to kill a fly."'" Law enforcement authorities
in some states have rejected this notion, however, as criminal libel
prosecutions have been revived as a tool to punish purveyors ofc'
certain viewpoints expressed on the Internet.
A. Early Criminal Libel Statutes
The "ignominious history"'' 2 of criminal libel is "notoriously
intertwined with the history of governmental attempts to suppress
criticism.' ' 13 Under the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, the oldest
known written legal code, a man could be punished for "point[ing] a
finger at a priestess ... unless he could justify it.' 14 A millennium
ago, Alfred the Great decreed that "[i]f anyone is guilty of public
slander, and it is proved against him, it is to be compensated with no
lighter penalty than the cutting off of his tongue."'
' 5
In England, the royal courts in 1275 obtained jurisdiction over
libel and slander, which were previously adjudicated in the
ecclesiastical courts.' 6  Libel prosecutions served the function of
"preserv[ing] order and peace in a feudal system of government by
enforcing the obligation of the people to their traditional rulers."' 7
Later, the English Star Chamber punished seditious libel without
giving the accused either the benefit of a jury trial or the opportunity
to prove the truth of his or her statements. 8  The Star Chamber
"punished libelers to preserve peace and to protect the kingdom."', 9
Truth did not justify libelous statements; in fact, "the greater the truth,
F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[S]peech which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately
proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated
incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes."). Additionally,
the Supreme Court recently reiterated that "fighting words" and "true threats" are not protected
speech. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). Fighting words are those "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). True threats are "those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
11. Press Release, Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Attacks First Amendment
Ideals by Pursuing Former Student, Says SPJ (Dec. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
12. Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 1973).
13. Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1506 (D.S.C. 1991).
14. State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965).
15. Fitts, 779 F. Supp. at 1506 (internal quotations omitted).
16. Id.
17. Browne, 206 A.2d at 594.
18. Fitts, 779 F. Supp. at 1506.
19. Browne, 206 A.2d at 595.
2005]
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the greater the libel. 2°  Recent scholarship on criminal libel has
focused on the illegitimacy of tracing criminal libel's origins to the
',English common law.
2 1
American colonists were subjected to vigorous prosecution of
criminal libels against the Crown.22  John Peter Zenger was
infamously tried in New York in 1735 for a published-and
truthful-attack on the colonial governor.23 Although the royal judge
denied Zenger's defense of truth, Andrew Hamilton persuaded the
jury to acquit Zenger nonetheless.24 The Zenger trial influenced
drafters of state constitutions25 to include provisions making truth
admissible as a defense to criminal libel.26 Most state legislatures,
nevertheless, adopted a formulation first suggested by Alexander
Hamilton while defending a man accused of libeling Thomas
Jefferson, and thus, in most states truth became a defense to libel only
if the truth was published "with good motives and for justifiable
ends."27  By 1952, twelve years before the United States Supreme
Court expounded new constitutional standards for criminal libel
laws, 28 twenty-seven states allowed truth as a defense to libel only if
the truth was published for good motives and justifiable ends.29
Meanwhile, eleven states made truth an absolute defense, seven states
made truth merely admissible in defense, and three states had no
provisions on the topic at all.
30
B. Criminal Libel Becomes Virtually Obsolete
The Supreme Court in 1964 established stringent new
constitutional standards for criminal libel statutes and thus signaled
20. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
21. See Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in
American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 433, 451 (2004) ("Yet Coke was wrong;
Blackstone was wrong. The Anglo-American legal origins of criminal libel are not to be found
in the English common law.").
22. Fitts, 779 F. Supp. at 1507.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. One of the primary aims of the various state constitutions and the federal constitution
was to curb "the law of seditious libel, that branch of criminal libel law which had been used to
control criticism of the government." Id.
26. Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 COLtrM. L. REV. 521, 524
(1952).
27. Id.
28. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
29. See Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, supra note 26, at 525.
30. Id. at 525.
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the societal disfavor toward such laws. First, the Court held in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 1 that public officials suing for civil
defamation had to prove that the alleged defamatory "statement was
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not., 32 Next, the
Court held in Garrison v. Louisiana33 that, when it came to speech
about public officials or public affairs, "only those false statements
made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity
demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or
criminal sanctions." 34 The Garrison Court accordingly invalidated as
unconstitutional Louisiana's criminal libel statute, which punished
false statements made with mere common law malice, or ill will.
35
Following Garrison, antiquated criminal libel statutes in various
36states were either struck down by judges or repealed by legislators.
Almost universally, citing failure to require actual malice for false
statements made about public affairs and failure to allow truth to
serve as an absolute defense, courts struck down criminal libel
statutes in Mississippi, 37 Pennsylvania,38 Arkansas,39 California,
40
Alaska,4 1 Georgia,42 South Carolina,4 3 Colorado,4 4 New Mexico,
Montana,46 Alabama, 47 Utah,48 and Puerto Rico.49  The Supreme
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Id. at 279-80.
33. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
34. Id. at 74.
35. Id. at 78.
36. Post-Garrison, only a few courts have upheld criminal libel statutes in the face of
First Amendment challenges. Kansas' criminal libel statute was upheld by a federal appellate
panel that believed Kansas legislators, who enacted the law after New York Times and Garrison,
must have meant to incorporate an actual malice standard. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d
1058, 1073 (10th Cir. 1995). Illinois' criminal libel statute, which did not have an explicit
actual malice standard, was upheld insofar as it applied to statements about a person who was
neither a public figure nor a public official. See Illinois v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Il1.
1984).
37. Boydstun v. State, 249 So. 2d 411 (Miss. 1971).
38. Commonwealth v. Arnao, 286 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1972).
39. Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1975).
40. Eberle v. Mun. Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
41. Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978).
42. Williamson v. State, 295 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. 1982).
43. Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1502 (D.S.C. 1991).
44. People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1991) (partial invalidation).
45. State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
46. State v. Helfrich, 922 P.2d 1159 (Mont. 1996).
47. Ivey v. State, 821 So. 2d 937, 946 (Ala. 2001).
48. In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, 61 P.3d 1038, 1038 (Utah 2002).
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Court reversed the conviction of a man charged under Kentucky's
common-law criminal libel scheme, which was found to be vague and
overbroad.50 Likewise, two lower federal courts found a federal
criminal law, which prohibited libelous statements on the outside of
envelopes placed in the mail, unconstitutional as overbroad and
vague. 51 By 2004, only fourteen states 52 had criminal libel laws that
had not been adjudged unconstitutional in some way.
Thus, after Garrison, convictions for criminal libel became
exceedingly rare. One study concluded that there were fifty-two
threatened or actual criminal libel prosecutions in the United States
between 1965 and 1996, making criminal libel cases on average a less
than twice-annual occurrence in this country.5 3 When criminal libel
laws were invoked, many courts recognized that police,54 prosecutors,
and others in political power 5 selectively sought enforcement of
criminal libel laws against political rivals,56 those who challenged
49. Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2003).
50. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
51. Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Handler, 383
F. Supp. 1267 (D. Md. 1974).
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.01 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 18-4801 (Michie 2002);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004 (2001); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.370 (West 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.765 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.510 (Michie 2001); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 ( 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
15-01 (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 771 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404
(2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.010 (West
1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.01 (West 2001).
53. MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, CRIMINALIZING SPEECH ABOUT REPUTATION: THE
LEGACY OF CRIMINAL LIBEL IN THE U.S. AFTER SULLIVAN & GARRISON 45-56 (2003) (on file
with author).
54. See Ashton, 384 U.S. at 195 (reversing the conviction of a Kentucky labor activist
who was charged with criminal libel for alleging that a local police chief and sheriff engaged in
various illegal activities to benefit management in a miners' strike); Gottschalk v. State, 575
P.2d 289, 289-90 (Alaska 1978) (reversing the conviction of a man who was charged with
criminal libel for accusing a state trooper of taking $250 from the glove compartment of the
man's truck).
55. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64 (1964) (reversing the conviction of a
Louisiana lawyer who was charged with criminal libel after he accused local judges of laziness,
inefficiency, and a lenient attitude toward crime).
56. See Ivey v. State, 821 So. 2d 937, 939 (Ala. 2001) (reversing the criminal libel
conviction of an Alabama lawyer who allegedly paid a woman to say that a state senator and
candidate for Lieutenant Governor had assaulted the woman); State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591,
592 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (invalidating a criminal libel charge against a mayoral
candidate in New Jersey who accused his opponent, the incumbent, of"us[ing] his public office
for private profit"). Additionally, the threat of a criminal libel prosecution has been invoked in
various political battles outside the campaign context. For example, the Draper, Utah city
manager accused the city's mayor of criminal libel in 1996 for writing a letter to the city's
13,000 residents accusing the city manager of being "arbitrary, high-handed and often
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their authority,57 and journalists58 who dared to raise the possibility of
government ineptness or corruption.59 Scholars argued that the
relative paucity of prosecutions for criminal libel, "which is
committed many times each day,",60 indicated that prosecutors applied
criminal libel laws arbitrarily and abusively. 61 Government officials
displayed a tendency to wield criminal libel laws not only as swords
to strike at political enemies, but also as muzzles to silence politically
unpopular speech or minority viewpoints.62
demeaning." Jon Ure, Draper Mayor Still at Odds with Council, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 19,
1996, at B2.
57. See Kansas Newspaper, Staffers Convicted of Criminal Libel, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=3659
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (reporting that a Kansas newspaper editor and publisher were
convicted of criminal libel in 2002 for publishing a story accusing two public officials of living
in a county other than the one in which they served).
58. See Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1502 (D.S.C. 1991) (finding, upon request for
declaratory relief by a journalist who was arrested and charged with criminal libel for an article
accusing two state senators of corruption, that South Carolina criminal libel law was
unconstitutionally overbroad for failing to provide an actual malice standard and was void for
vagueness); Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Ark. 1975) (reversing the conviction of a
weekly newspaper editor and publisher in Arkansas who accused the sheriff of playing a key
role in the local illegal drug trade); Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626, 627-28 (Pa. 1972)
(reversing the conviction of the managing editor of a weekly Italian-and-English-language
newspaper for publishing an article that accused a man who had "considerable influence with
members of... the Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Board" of being president of a club that
was "well-known as a hangout for sex[ual] deviates").
59. This application of criminal libel is particularly troubling, given that uncovering
corruption in government is one of the primary First Amendment-protected functions of the
press. See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 64 (lst Cir. 2003) (stating that a newspaper's
accusations of corruption among government officials were "at the heart of the First
Amendment protections of speech and the press").
60. Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 294 (Alaska 1978). One scholar speculated that
criminal libel "is ostensibly committed in this country a thousand times, and possibly ten or
twenty thousand times, daily." Robert A. Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of
Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REV. 984, 984 (1956).
61. In a study examining criminal libel prosecutions in the first half of the 20th century,
one scholar discovered that
half the cases from 1920 on can be classified as basically political....
Commonest among the political cases were those in which prosecutions were
filed against an unsuccessful political candidate or his supporters for statements
made during a campaign, now ended, concerning his now successful opponent.
Of the same sort were prosecutions of persons, who feeling aggrieved, made
disagreeable statements about persons firmly entrenched in public office or
power. One may suspect that in such cases the law was being used by the
successful personage or his friends as a means of punishing their less potent
enemies.
Leflar, supra note 60, at 985-86.
62. Id. at 1032 ("The successful prosecutions were, for the most part, for statements of a
sort likely to have been unpopular at the time and place they were made.").
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C. States Use the Internet to Revive Criminal Libel
Although criminal libel statutes had fallen into near desuetude in
the latter part of the 20th century, government officials in the 21st
century are dusting off the remaining 19th century laws to target
speech on the Internet.6 3 For example, two journalists in Kansas were
convicted of criminal libel in 2002 for postings on their newspaper's
Web site alleging that the mayor of Kansas City, Kansas, lived in a
neighboring county, a fact that would have made her ineligible for
office.64 In Georgetown, Colorado in 2002, the mayor-elect accused
the incumbent mayor of posting criminally libelous statements on the
incumbent's Web site just three days before the pair squared off in an
65
election. In Wisconsin, a man was convicted of criminal libel for
posting an Internet advertisement soliciting sex partners in the name
of his ex-boss.6 6 Internet speech has drawn criminal libel charges and
convictions in various other states as well.67
The Media Law Resource Center reported seventy-seven cases
of threatened and actual criminal libel prosecutions between 1964, the
year of the Supreme Court's opinion in Garrison, and 2002.68
Twenty-five of those cases-nearly one-third of the total-took place
in 1997 or later, roughly the time period in which use of the Internet
became widespread. Of the twenty-five cases since 1997, eight-
approximately one-third-involved speech on the Internet. Without
the Internet criminal libel cases, the number of reported cases since
1997 would have totaled seventeen, or fewer than three per year-
63. Ken Paulson, Changing Rules of Rudeness, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 8, 2002, at G3
("There's an increasing temptation for school administrators to try to control the speech of
students off school grounds, particularly when unpalatable viewpoints are posted on private
Web sites. Sarcastic and cutting comments that were once shared over lunch in the cafeteria
now get wider distribution via the Internet.").
64. James C. Goodale, It Can't Happen Here-But It Did, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 6, 2002, at 3
("In the last several years... prosecutors have been bringing criminal libel charges for
publication on the Internet. There have been five such cases in the last two years.").
65. Kit Miniclier, Mayor-Elect Says Website Contains Libelous Items, DENVER POST,
Apr. 4, 2002, at B4 (reporting that the mayor-elect objected to Internet allegations that she had
used cocaine, had assisted in a theft, and had been fired from a previous job).
66. Lisa Sink, Man Convicted of Posting Ex-Boss' Name on Sex Site, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Aug. 11, 2000, at B 1.
67. See, e.g., Woman Sentenced for Internet Message, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Sept.
22, 1999, at B3 (reporting that a Louisiana woman was sentenced to 10 days in jail for posting
false information about a police officer on the Internet); Jennifer Farrell, Parody Web Site:
Offensive or Illegal?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at Al (reporting that county and
state officials launched a criminal libel investigation related to a Website that parodied the sex
lives of various faculty members at a Florida high school).
68. MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 53, at 42.
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close to the average of less than two cases per year for the time period
of 1964 to 1996. With the Internet criminal libel cases added,
however, the average number of cases between 1997 and 2002
increased to more than four per year.69
While various factors, including the relatively small number of
cases involved, make it difficult to draw conclusions about a causal
relationship between the Internet and threatened or actual criminal
libel prosecutions, it remains important to examine the role played by
unique characteristics of online media in the Internet criminal libel
cases. Such an examination provides a basis for drawing conclusions
about whether these unique characteristics justify different legal
treatment for alleged criminal libels than would be present with non-
Internet speech. 70
In the next part of this article, I will resume discussion of the Ian
Lake case, the Utah case involving the ultimately unsuccessful
prosecution of a high school student for Internet speech. Based on
analysis of the Utah case and other Internet criminal libel cases, I
conclude that the unique characteristics of the Internet as a medium of
expression-primarily decentralization, anonymity, low entry
barriers, wide reach, and long shelf life-justify increased rather than
decreased legal protection of speech.
III. 'No ONE HAS EVER SEEN HIM SOBER'
On May 5, 2000, Ian Michael Lake, a 16-year old high school
junior at the time, used his home computer to create a site on the
World Wide Web that would soon have the tiny town of Milford,
Utah in an uproar.7 1 Lake's page 72 was the teen's response to another
Milford High School student's Web site that had labeled Lake's
female friend "Slut of the Week" and had made various derogatory
comments about her.73 Lake's posting responded in kind by calling
69. Id. at 42-56.
70. See Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus When You Remove the Lens
Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make it Particularly Urgent for the
Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity,
Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 956
(1996) (chronicling the under-protection of speech on various new media and concluding that
"permitting technological discrimination is inimical to freedom of expression").
71. Mark Havnes, Ribald Web Site Gets Teen Exiled, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 26, 2000, at
B.
72. The page was hosted by the ISP Lycos at http://www.angelfire.com/utihomemilford.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re 1.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah 5th
Dist. Juv. Ct. Aug. 1, 2000).
73. Id.
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several female classmates "sluts,,, 74 identifying a female faculty
member as a "bitch," and accusing a male faculty member of
homosexual conduct. 75  Lake's site also referred to Milford High
School Principal Walter Schofield as the "town drunk' 76 and labeled
others associated with the school as lazy or incompetent.77
The type of language and insinuations used by Lake may well
have been common among students at Milford High School in 2000,
but school administrators-spurred by the angry reaction of an entire
town-appeared to treat Lake's speech differently than it would have
been treated if Lake had simply scrawled it on a piece of paper and
left copies in the school bathroom. Instead of facing just suspension
for 10 days for behavior "disruptive to normal school proceedings, 78
Lake faced the full force of the criminal law.
A. History of Criminal Libel in Utah
Utah's criminal libel statute79 remained virtually unchanged from
1876 until it was struck down as unconstitutional8° in 2002. The 1876
Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah punished criminal libel
against "[e]very person who willfully, and with a malicious intent to
injure another, publishes or procures to be published any libel."'" At
that time, criminal libel was defined as:
a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing or by signs or
pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is
dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby to
expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.
82
At Utah's constitutional convention in 1895, Salt Lake City
newspaper editor and convention delegate, C.C. Goodwin, proposed
that the Utah Constitution include a provision that would make truth
74. Joe Baird, Trouble Fitting In, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 28, 2000, at A 1.
75. Amended Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re I.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah
5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Jan. 23, 2001).
76. Id.
77. Baird, supra note 74.
78. Administrative Policies and Procedures, Sec. VIII, in BEAVER COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (April 6, 1999), available at
http://www.beaver.kl 2.ut.us/boepolicies.html.
79. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-501 to -503 (2003).
80. InreI.M.L.,2002UT 110,61 P.3d 1038, 1038 (Utah 2002).
81. COMP. LAWS UTAH § 1955 (1876). Criminal libel in the Territory was punishable by
a fine of up to $1,000 and a term in the county jail of up to one year. Id.
82. Id. § 1954.
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83
an absolute defense in both civil and criminal libel cases.
Goodwin's proposal was rejected, however, because other convention
delegates believed that even some true statements should be
punishable as criminal libel. Judge Charles S. Varian of Salt Lake
City noted that most states' laws made truth only a qualified defense
to libel "because the State in looking after its business does not permit
the publication of even the truth, unless there be a good purpose and
justifiable end connected with it."84
Since at least 1876, Utah law prohibited truthful statements made
with common-law malice, or ill will, that brought others into
disrepute unless those statements were made "with good motives and
for justifiable ends.,, 85 Before the 21st century, Utah's highest court
had only two occasions to consider cases involving the criminal libel
statute. Just eight months after the constitutional convention, the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah upheld the criminal libel
conviction of a man who accused the head of the Salt Lake Building
& Loan Association of misadministration and called him a "gorilla-
faced boss. 86 Five weeks later, the same court ordered a new trial for
a newspaper editor convicted of criminal libel for printing an article
charging that one of the delegates to the constitutional convention was
"not a fit and proper person" for the job.87 Even though it felt
obligated to order the new trial because the trial judge had made
improper statements that influenced the jury, the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Utah at that time emphasized that public officials
could be criticized only "upon proper occasion, from proper
motives. 88
In 1973, nine years after New York Times and Garrison, the Utah
Legislature created a new criminal offense, called "criminal
defamation," that purported to require actual malice.89 At the same
83. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO
ADOPT A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 320 (1898).
84. Id.
85. COMP. LAWS UTAH § 1957 (1876).
86. People v. Ritchie, 12 UT 180,42 P. 209 (Utah 1895).
87. People v. Glassman, 12 UT 238, 240, 42 P. 956, 957 (Utah 1895).
88. Id. at 244, 42 P. at 958.
89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404 (2003) ("A person is guilty of criminal defamation if he
knowingly communicates to any person orally or in writing any information which he knows to
be false and knows will tend to expose any other living person to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule.").
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time, the Legislature kept the century-old criminal libel statute9" on
the books without changing it to comport with the constitutional
requirements of New York Times and Garrison. Neither the criminal
libel statute nor the criminal defamation statute received much
attention 91 until 2000, when an unlikely teenager authored a Web
page that spawned Utah's first-ever case of alleged criminal libel on
the Internet.
B. Web Posting Enflames Community, Lands Teen in Jail
Ian Lake's Web posting, as evidenced by an excerpt of Lake's
text quoted in a juvenile judge's order, could generally be described
as crudeness of the type common in school hallways across
America:
92
Town Drunk. Every town has a drunk and Milford is no exception
(actually, [M]ilford has about 30). The who [sic] has been chosen
as the town drunk for Milford is none other tha[n] Milford High
Principal Uncle Walt. In all the years Walt has been in Milford no
one has ever seen him sober. One time I though[t] Walt was sober
but then he passed out and I knew he was tippin[g] back the jug
again. Some might think that because Walt is principal he
shouldn't be drinking. Well, to those people I say this[:] "F[-]
YOU! THIS IS AMERICA AND WALT CAN DO WHAT HE
WANTS!"....
Milford High School. Principal Walt: Town Drunk. DICKHEAD;
Secretary Wendy Sleeps with Walt; Counselor Erickson: Possible
Homosexual leading a double life; Mr. Jensen: Possibly addicted to
speed or some other narcotic; and Mrs. Jensen: BITCH.
93
Lake made no threats or references to violence. He later told
police that he had used his home computer to do research for a school
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-502 (2003) ("A person is guilty of criminal libel if he
intentionally and with malicious intent to injure another publishes or procures to be published
any libel.").
91. Utah newspapers reported only one criminal libel conviction after 1973; then-Salt
Lake County Attorney Ted Cannon was convicted in 1987 and spent one month in jail for
statements made about a news reporter. Hilary Groutage, Is Web Diatribe Libel?: Milford
Teen's Case is in a Gray Area of the Law, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 27, 2000, at B 1.
92. The Washington Post described Lake's Web pages as "an electronic version of
bathroom wall graffiti." Wax, supra note 3. The Christian Science Monitor, meanwhile, called
Lake's Internet postings "crude and unkind." Biele, supra note 4.
93. Amended Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re I.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah
5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Jan. 23, 2001).
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paper on explosives, but his Web site did not discuss that research.94
Lake's site included a "Quote of the Week" from the rock band "Rage
Against the Machine," whose members sang on their CD, "The Battle
of Los Angeles," that "all Hell can't stop us now." 95 Even though
Lake created the site alone, he used the plural "we" on several
occasions-a fact later invoked by police as evidence of a plot.
96
Lake's five-page Web site identified and criticized a total of forty-
nine Milford High School students or employees. The site also
praised a few of his friends.97
Although Lake told no one about his Web site, which did not
identify him as its creator, Lake did leave an unsigned note in the
school's computer lab that contained the Internet address of his
posting.98 Within a week of the site's creation, the Beaver County
Sheriffs Office had received "numerous complaints from concerned
parents." 99 Some of Milford's 1,500 residents saw parallels in Lake's
site with the Internet rantings of 1999 Columbine High School killers
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold;'00 a few parents even "refused to
allow their children to attend school until the suspect [was]
identified."''
Five days after Beaver County deputies received copies of
Lake's postings from a Milford woman, Lake wore a "Rage Against
the Machine" T-shirt to school and thereby brought suspicion on
himself as the creator of the despised Web pages.'0 2 The next day,
Lake's Internet Service Provider ("ISP") responded to a Beaver
County Sheriffs subpoena and identified Lake as the author of the
Web site. 0 3 Later that evening on May 18, 2000, police arrested
Lake at his home and seized his computer.t°4
94. Memorandum in Opposition to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, In re
I.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah 5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Sept. 1, 2000).
95. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re I.M.L., No. 968716
(Utah 5th Dist. Juv. Ct. July 31, 2000).
96. Id.
97. Baird, supra note 74.
98. Amended Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re I.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah
5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Jan. 23, 2001).
99. Id.
100. See Wax, supra note 3 (noting the tendency to equate "irreverent and sometimes off-
color" content posted on the Internet by high school students with the Web pages of Harris and
Klebold).
101. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re I.M.L., No. 968716
(Utah 5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Aug. 1, 2000).
102. Id.
103. Havnes, supra note 71.
104. Id.
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After his arrest, Lake spent seven days in a juvenile detention
facility in Cedar City, Utah, and, while his case was pending, was
ordered by a juvenile judge to move from Milford and live instead
with his grandparents in southern California.' 0 5 Lake's father agreed
with the judge that leaving town was the best thing for Lake, given
the anonymous threats received by the Lakes.10 6 Journalists around
the globe portrayed Lake's forced exile as something straight from the
English Star Chamber: "After seven nights in prison the hapless teen
was run out of town and banished from the city limits."'
0 7
Beaver County deputies recommended that County Attorney Leo
Kanell file Class B misdemeanor charges of criminal libel 10 8 and
criminal slander. 0 9 But the County Attorney's Office pursued only a
single count of criminal libel. Prosecutors opted not to charge Lake
with criminal defamation." 0  Lake pleaded not guilty"' and
challenged the criminal libel law as unconstitutional for failure to
incorporate the actual malice standard in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan112 and Garrison v. Louisiana.113  The County Attorney
countered by arguing that the Utah appellate courts had interpreted
Utah's civil law of defamation to include an actual malice
requirement, and the courts should likewise find that the criminal law
of libel included an actual malice requirement. 1
4
Fifth District Juvenile Judge Joseph E. Jackson determined that
Utah's criminal libel statute implicitly incorporated the New York
Times actual malice standard. 15 Judge Jackson, however, recognized
the potential for the statute to be declared unconstitutional by the
Utah appellate courts and, therefore, he certified the question for
interlocutory appeal'16 The Utah Supreme Court heard oral
105. Id.
106. ld.
107. Matt Kelly, Kelly's I, MIRROR (London), June 12, 2000, at 20.
108. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-502 (2000).
109. Id. § 76-9-507.
110. Id. § 76-9-404.
111. Milford Teen Pleads Not Guilty to Libel, DESERET NEWS, June 21, 2000, at B3.
112. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
113. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
114. Memorandum in Opposition to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, In re
I.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah 5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Sept. 1, 2000).
115. Amended Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Petition, In re I.M.L., No. 968716 (Utah
5th Dist. Juv. Ct. Jan. 23, 2001).
116. Id.
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arguments in March 2002 and issued its decision November 15,
2002.117
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[q]uite
obviously, the plain language of Utah's [criminal libel] statute does
not comport with the requirements laid down by the United States
Supreme Court," including a requirement of actual malice for
statements about public officials and truth as an absolute defense.'
1 8
Next, the court held that the juvenile court erred by importing the
actual malice standard from civil law into its interpretation of the
criminal libel statute. 1 9  Finally, the court rejected the state's
argument, presented for the first time on appeal, that the criminal
defamation statute, which purports to include an actual malice
requirement for statements about public officials, should be grafted
onto the criminal libel statute to save it from unconstitutionality. 20 In
striking down the criminal libel statute as overbroad,121 the court took
pains to clarify that it was not passing judgment on whether "Utah's
criminal defamation statute passes constitutional muster."'
' 22
C. Criminal Libel Case Wouldn't Die Even Though the Statute
Did
In addition to the criminal charge, Lake faced a civil defamation
lawsuit filed in August 2000 by Schofield, the former Milford High
principal who left town soon after Lake did. 123 Eventually, Schofield
and Lake settled the civil suit. The settlement reportedly included a
written apology from Lake to Schofield. 12 4 As part of the agreement,
Lake dropped a threatened civil-rights lawsuit against Schofield,
25
who allegedly "struck [Lake] during an altercation in 1999 and failed
to provide adequate accommodations to address [Lake's] epilepsy.',' 126
117. InreI.M.L.,2002UT 110,61 P.3d 1038, 1038(Utah2002).
118. Id. 18-19, at 1044.
119. Id. 21,at1045.
120. Id. 7 24-27, at 1046-47.
121. Id. 30, at 1048.
122. Id. 24, at 1046 n.12.
123. Joe Baird & Thomas Burr, Teen Seeking Dismissal of Libel Suit, SALT LAKE TRB.,
Nov. 29, 2000, at D1.
124. Jennifer Toomer-Cook, Defamation Suit Being Settled, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 19,
2001, at B 1.
125. Joe Baird, Civil Actions Near a Settlement in Teen's Web Libel Incident, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Mar. 20, 2001, at B2.
126. Baird & Burr, supra note 123.
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Nevertheless, even after the civil suits were settled and the
criminal libel statute was declared unconstitutional, Lake's legal
battles were not over. In April 2002, perhaps anticipating that the
criminal libel statute would be struck down, Beaver County
prosecutors filed four counts of criminal defamation against Lake.
127
Kanell, the Beaver County prosecutor, vowed to press forward with
the prosecution under the 1973 criminal defamation statute, which he
felt would withstand the constitutional challenge that the criminal
libel statute did not. 28  Kanell, however, was defeated in his
November 2002 re-election bid,' 29  and his successor, Von
Christiansen, had the criminal defamation charges dismissed.
30
Although his family spent tens of thousands of dollars on his
legal defense, Lake said the criminal libel case actually did him some
good because it "got [him] out of Milford and to California, where
[he] graduated with honors from Palm Springs High School.' 13  By
the time the case finally came to a close, Lake was 19-years old,
working as Webmaster for a real-estate company in Desert Hot
Springs, California, and applying for admission to the University of
California at Riverside.1
32
One of the most bizarre and groundbreaking cases in Utah
history wrapped up with a series of interesting twists. Utah's largest
newspaper assessed the case in a no-holds barred editorial: "What Ian
Lake did would probably make John Adams wince. What Leo Kanell
did would make Thomas Jefferson vomit.' ' 133  Meanwhile, Lake's
father filed a notice of intent to sue Milford and Beaver County
officials for $50,000 in legal fees and other costs incurred as a result
of the prosecution of his son.'
34
Kanell admitted that he had been ignorant of the parallel (and
potentially constitutional) criminal defamation statute: "If I'd known
this [defamation] law was on the books, I would have filed it sooner,"
127. Alan Edwards, Libel Case Out: Law 'Overbroad,' DESERET NEWS, Nov. 16, 2002, at
BI.
128. Christopher Smart, Utah Court Kills 1876 Libel Statute, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16,
2002, at Al.
129. Edwards, supra note 127.
130. Mark Havnes, Web Site Charges Dropped, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 8, 2003, at Al.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Editorial, Free Speech Wins, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 10, 2003, at A8.
134. Mark Havnes, Ex-Milford Student's Father to Sue, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 15, 2003,
at B2.
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he told one news reporter. 3 5 Kanell also admitted that his crusade to
convict Ian Lake was a paternalistic effort to "help a young man who
has problems.', 136 It became clear that many residents, police officers,
and prosecutors in Beaver County viewed the entire case not as
preventing a breach of the peace or even seeking redress for a private
wrong, but rather, in the words of one letter-to-the-editor writer, "an
issue of community retribution and mandatory atonement."'
137
Finally, Lake said he would create a new Web site that would
tell all the details of his case and he planned to re-post the original
caustic Web pages in an effort to rankle people in Milford, noting that
"legally there's nothing they can do about it."'
13 8
D. Role of Unique Characteristics of the Internet in Criminal
Libel Cases
No one will ever know how Beaver County Attorney Leo Kanell
and the patrons of Milford High School would have reacted if Lake's
comments had been made, not on the Internet, but rather, in the
school bathroom or on a flier distributed at lunch. There is evidence,
however, that what set Lake's words apart from thousands of similar
commentaries made by high school students daily was the medium
through which the words were communicated. 3 9
In Ian Lake's case, the Milford community appeared particularly
agitated that Lake's rantings appeared on the Internet. The perception
of the Internet as a haven for lawbreakers, 140 coupled with the role of
the Internet in the 1999 Columbine High School shootings, caused
parents and others in Milford to read potential violence into Lake's
rather innocuous words about purported homosexual, drunken, and
drug-addicted school officials. Lake himself was eminently surprised
that Milford residents linked his Web site to Columbine or any other
sort of violence.' 4 ' Thus, the question arises whether Lake was
135. Joe Baird, New Battle Brewing Over Web Invective, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 2002,
at Al.
136. Havnes, supra note 130.
137. Jake Starkey, Letter to the Editor, Student is Owed Apology, DESERET NEWS, Nov.
20, 2002, at A8.
138. Havnes, supranote 134.
139. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
7 (The MIT Press 1964).
140. See infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
141. Lake's incredulity was evident in the exchange he had with a Beaver County sheriff's
deputy the day Lake was arrested:
Ian: It wasn't nothing to do with Columbine. I'm not even thinking about
anything like that. I guarantee you that.
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arrested and charged with criminal libel because of what he wrote or
because of where he wrote it. Clearly, the "rumors" flying around
among parents 142 played a role in the criminalization of Lake, an
admitted outsider whose dyed hair, outrageous outfits, and California
roots did not go over well in the small southern Utah community. 1
43
Because the Milford community had gotten so worked up
(deputy sheriffs engaged in a virtual manhunt for a would-be killer
who didn't exist), the community appeared to decide to exact some
punishment' 44 of Lake beyond the remedies provided by the law of
Ian: I mean I ain't nothing like that. That's why I couldn't figure out how it got
anything like [this] because I was told.., it's linked to Columbine .... And
I'm like, "How?" You know[?]
Ian: I don't see, I don't see how it's a big deal, how this is linked to Columbine in
any way.
John: Well, maybe I can shed a little bit of light on it for you. You don't see how
it's connected to Columbine in any way because you built these [Web pages].
You know what the intent was. You know why you did this. You know what
you put in there.
Ian: Yeah but there's nothing in there that's like threatening anybody.
John: Well, but we got parents out there that are hearing rumors. And you know
how rumors are in small towns.
Ian: Yep.
John: And you can say it on the street comer today and by tomorrow it will be 180
degrees backwards, and it will be ten times worse. And you know a big part
of that I'm sure is what we have. But whatever the reason that's why this has
become such a big production. Is [sic] because of the uh concern from the
parents at the school, concern from the faculty of the school. Believe me this
has had a deep impact. We had an officer up there at the school all day today.
Just to be there. Just in case somebody decided to come in and start shooting
the place up or blow the place up or ....
Ian: This seems to get out of hand so easily. I mean this wasn't nothing like that
Brief of Amici Curiae for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al., Appendix
47-51, In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002) (No. 20010159-SC).
142. The United States Supreme Court commented on the inappropriateness of tying
prosecutions for criminal libel to the reactions of listeners:
[T]o make an offense of conduct which is "calculated to create disturbances of
the peace" leaves wide open the standard of responsibility. It involves
calculations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular group, not
an appraisal of the nature of the comments per se. This kind of criminal libel
"makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no self-control and
cannot refrain from violence."
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 151 (1954)).
143. See Baird, supra note 74.
144. See Starkey, supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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civil defamation. Although Milford High School Principal Walter
Schofield pursued a civil defamation lawsuit against Lake, a lawsuit
against a likely judgment-proof teenager would not have satisfied the
townspeople. 145  Thus, county prosecutors brought criminal charges,
once again demonstrating that the only purpose of criminal libel is
"(1) to circumvent the restrictions placed on civil libel litigation by
Sullivan and by its progeny-a result which Garrison has foreclosed,
or (2) to punish an indigent who could not be reached by a civil
judgment for damages."' 146
Lake's case is not the only one of its kind. 147 The Internet played
a prominent role in at least six 148 other recent cases of threatened or
actual prosecution for criminal libel. In 1999, a Louisiana woman
was convicted of criminal libel and sentenced to spend 10 days in jail
for posting false information about a police officer on the Internet.
149
In that case, 24-year old Amy Patton pleaded no contest to the
defamation charge and was given a suspended jail sentence, but was
145. See August Gribbin, Reputations Can Be Ruined on the Internet, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
2, 2001, at AI (quoting Harvard Law School Professor John Zittrain, who said that in the case of
Internet defamation, "the authors are likely to be judgment-proof- unlike a large newspaper or
publisher, they don't have much money"). See also Biele, supra note 4 (noting that while
parents may sometimes be held liable for the actions of their children, most states cap the
parents' liability at an average of $2,500, unless parental negligence is shown).
146. United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1278 (D. Md. 1974).
147. It is important to note here that the substantive allegations against Lake were never
tested in court. Even if the Utah criminal libel statute had included an actual malice standard-
or if Lake had been prosecuted under the criminal defamation statute, which did require actual
malice-Lake still could have defended himself by arguing that his speech was protected by the
First Amendment as truth or fair comment. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990). Lake's speech clearly did not rise to the level of "true threats" or speech likely to
produce imminent lawless action because he advocated no harm or violence at all. Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). The analysis of
whether Lake's words were "fighting words" involves a determination of whether they are
words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In the view of some
scholars, the "fighting words" doctrine should have become a dead letter in contemporary
society. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 83 (1999) (quoting Stephen W.
Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980)) (stating that the
fighting words doctrine is "nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no
place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expression").
148. The Media Law Resource Center data includes six recent Internet criminal libel cases
in addition to the two Lake cases (one prosecution for criminal libel, which resulted in the Utah
Supreme Court declaring the law unconstitutional, and one prosecution for criminal defamation,
which was ultimately dropped). See MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 53, at 45-52.
149. Id.; Woman Sentenced for Internet Message, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Sept. 22,
1999, at B3.
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required to perform two days of community service.150 The
prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney Schyler Marvin, stated that
"the anonymous nature of the Internet does not provide a person
targeted by a message to sue or confront the writer. '
Notwithstanding that assertion, Patton's identity was uncovered via
her ISP.1
5 2
Also in 1999, 32-year old Tulsa, Oklahoma police officer, Gary
E. Upton, was charged with one misdemeanor count of libel in
connection with an Internet advertisement listing his neighbor as "[the
owner of a] sex toy business and vendor in pornographic sites.' ' 3
After the woman received numerous telephone calls from around the
world, investigators tracked the ad to Upton via his ISP. 15 4 Upton
entered into a plea agreement that would result in the removal of the
conviction from his record after he performed forty hours of
community service, paid $1,000 in fines, and completed one year
probation. 1
55
Prosecutors in Waukesha County, Wisconsin investigated three
cases of alleged criminal libel during a short time span in 2000. One
man was charged with defamation in connection with an Internet ad
listing his female ex-boss's name and profile on a Web site called
"Sex on the Side."' 156 As a result of the listing, the boss received
twenty calls. She obtained an injunction against her former employee
and facilitated the government's criminal prosecution, which resulted
in a no-contest plea, a sentence of 100 hours of community service,
$1,280 in restitution, and psychological counseling for the former
employee. 57 Clearly, the Internet played a key role in the prosecution
for what might otherwise have been considered tasteless, but
harmless, foolishness. This sentiment was captured best by the
150. Woman Pleads No Contest to Charge Stemming from Internet Posting, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, Sept. 21, 1999, available at Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Brian Barber, Tulsa Police Webmaster Charged with Criminal Libel, TULSA WORLD,
Mar. 23, 1999, at 7.
154. Id. The prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney Mark Collier, said he had never seen a
criminal libel charge filed in Tulsa County. Collier told a newspaper reporter: "It's definitely
rare .... When the charge was first suggested, I said I didn't think there was such a thing as
criminal libel. But it exists." Id.
155. Tulsa Police Officer Gets Deferred Sentence, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, May
22, 1999, available at Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS.
156. Waukesha Man Charged with Defamation After Posting Comments on Web,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 7, 2000, available at Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS.
157. Sink, supra note 66.
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female boss herself who stated, "[S]teps need to be taken to prevent
'disturbed individuals (from) using the Internet to further their
hate."' ' 158  Her attorney equated the Internet posting to a common
form of expression not generally considered a criminal offense: "'We
used to just write graffiti on the restroom stalls,' said attorney Peter
Plaushines .... ,159 Indeed, the sentiment expressed by both the
female boss and her attorney describes the transformational power of
the Internet with respect to words. What traditionally would have
been considered a common and harmless form of expression, albeit
tasteless, has become a not-so-harmless and possibly even criminal
form of speech when penned on the Internet.
Wisconsin prosecutors charged another man with criminal libel
for posting nude photographs of his estranged girlfriend on the
Internet and soliciting sex partners in her name. 160  The man's
attorney planned to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, 161 but
the charge was ultimately dropped. 162  Meanwhile, the same
prosecutors investigated another case of alleged criminal libel in
which "a family therapist allegedly posed as his former wife's new
husband and posted an ad on a swingers site."'
163
In 2002 in Colorado, the mayor-elect of a small town asked
criminal prosecutors to investigate the former mayor, her political
opponent, for allowing anonymously posted statements about the
mayor-elect to remain on the former mayor's Web site.' 64 The
anonymous post accused the mayor-elect of using illegal drugs, being
fired from the city's police department, and assisting in the theft of
ammunition and drugs from an evidence locker. 65 After consulting
with prosecutors, the mayor-elect withdrew her request that the




159. Waukesha Man Charged with Defamation After Posting Comments on Web, supra
note 156.
160. Id.
161. See Sink, supra note 66.
162. MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 53, at 45-52.
163. Waukesha Man Charged with Defamation After Posting Comments on Web, supra
note 156.
164. Criminal Complaint Filed Against Georgetown's Ex-Mayor, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Apr. 4, 2002, available at Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS.
165. Id.
166. Georgetown's New Mayor Drops Libel Complaint Against Brooks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, Apr. 10, 2002, available at Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS.
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In Kansas, two journalists convicted in 2002 of seven
misdemeanor counts of criminal libel for statements about a politician
appealed their convictions to the Kansas Court of Appeals, which
took the matter under advisement in June 2004.167 That case also
sparked an ultimately unsuccessful effort by some Kansas legislators
to repeal the state's criminal defamation law.
168
IV. THE INTERNET DOES NOT JUSTIFY EXHUMING CRIMINAL LIBEL
For three hundred years in America, the advent of each
successive new medium of mass communication has caused a re-
examination of the availability and applicability of speech
protections. The cycle began long before the United States
Constitution was even adopted. The Massachusetts Legislature
banned the first American newspaper, Benjamin Harris's Publick
Occurrences Both Foreign and Domestick, after just one issue in
1690 because the publication did not have a government license.
169
Initially, the United States Supreme Court did not grant motion
pictures any protection, based on freedom of speech or any other
claimed right, against state prior restraint. 70 Broadcast media, radio,
and television were subjected to stringent regulation, despite the First
Amendment guarantees that by then had become entrenched for other
forms of mediated speech. 171 The level of speech protection to which
cable television broadcasters were entitled also spawned multiple
appellate court opinions.
112
167. Robert A. Cronkleton, Libel Convictions Appealed, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 17,
2004, at 3.
168. Emily Fredrix, Senate Rejects Repeal of Criminal Defamation Law, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSwiREs, Feb. 19, 2003, available at Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS.
169. Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L.
REv. 295, 315 (2001). Later, Massachusetts legislators, angered at critical news coverage in the
New England Courant, unilaterally forbade publisher James Franklin from printing anything
unless he first received government approval. Unable to get relief from the legislature or the
courts, James Franklin replaced himself as publisher with his 17-year old brother, Benjamin
Franklin, and the Courant resumed publication. Id. at 316-17.
170. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) ("It
cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple,
originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded... by the Ohio
Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion.").
171. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (noting that "special justifications for
regulation of the broadcast media" in early cases included the scarcity of broadcast frequencies
and the invasive nature of broadcasting).
172. See, e.g., Cmty. Communications. Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981); Preferred Communications. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
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Given its historical belief that "each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems[,]J " 73 the United States
Supreme Court has adopted discrete speech doctrines for print media,
motion pictures, broadcast media, and cable. Initially, new
technologies must struggle to assert their entitlement to First
Amendment protection. Professor Laurence Tribe lamented the fact
that "the Constitution [has] to be reinvented with the birth of each
new technology." 174 One scholar critiqued this "cycle of repression"
by observing "censorship is the bastard child of technology" and by
calling on government officials to allow the Internet to be "born
free."
175
Certain characteristics make the Internet different from other
forms of mediated communication, such as newspapers, motion
pictures, broadcast television, radio, and cable television. Once the
government has determined that the Internet is different than print
newspapers, for example, I contend that the government must then
engage in a two-step process before treating Internet speech
differently than print speech: first, the government must determine
that the unique characteristics of the Internet closely relate to the
government's justification for regulating Internet speech; 176 second,
the government must ensure that the means chosen to regulate speech
on the Internet are narrowly tailored to serve the asserted
governmental interest.177  Absent a close relationship and narrow
tailoring, the government may not restrict any more speech on the
Internet than it could restrict in a print newspaper.'
78
173. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
174. Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the Cycle
of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 266 (1994) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe,
The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Keynote
Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991).
175. Corn-Revere, supra note 174, at 264, 341.
176. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that, in the context
of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, a local land-use permit could not be conditioned
on a concession by the landowner that was unrelated to the government's justification for the
land-use regulation); see also Corn-Revere, supra note 174, at 311 ("Justice Scalia wrote [in
Nollan] that while the state could forbid 'shouting fire in a crowded theater,' it could not 'grant
dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.' In other words, there
must be an 'essential nexus' between the government's use of its authority and the problem to
be solved.").
177. Corn-Revere, supra note 174, at 311-14.
178. This test is used widely by courts when government engages in content-based
regulation of speech (i.e. regulation that targets speech for its message):
A content-based limitation on speech will be upheld only where the state
demonstrates that the limitation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.... This test involves three
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In the context of criminal prosecution of speakers for alleged
libels, the government's interests since the days of the English Star
Chamber have been to prevent breaches of the peace and to prevent
expression of criticism that could lead to revolution. 179 This article
assumes that the government's interests in preventing breaches of the
peace and in preventing criticism that could lead to revolution are
significant. 80  Before the government can restrict speech on the
Internet that would not be restricted in another medium, however, the
government must first demonstrate that the test outlined above for
medium-based regulation is satisfied. In applying the test, I examine
the following unique characteristics of the Internet: decentralization,
anonymity, a counter-cultural character, speed, low barriers to entry,
long shelf life, and wide reach.
A. Decentralized Control and Anonymity
No one owns the Internet, and those who post and send things on
the Internet do not have to identify themselves. Perhaps more than
any other characteristic, the decentralized nature and anonymity of the
Internet distinguish it from other communications media. As a
distributed network, the Internet has no central control point, but
rather "is comprised of an interconnected web of 'host' computers,
each of which can be accessed from virtually any point on the
network."' 81 It has been suggested that the Cold War warriors who
created early versions of the new medium in the 1960s wanted to
prevent total disruption of communication in the event of a
conventional or nuclear attack. 82 The diffuse nature of the Internet
can lead to the belief that "anything goes," and that the Internet is a
lawless haven for conspirators and terrorists. 83 While the Internet is
distinct inquiries: (1) whether the interests asserted by the state are compelling;
(2) whether the limitation is necessary to further those interests; and (3) whether
the limitation is narrowly drawn to achieve those interests.
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564-65
(E.D. Va. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
179. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
180. Corn-Revere, supra note 174, at 308 ("[P]resumption would disfavor regulation
unless the government could demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly drawn to serve a
significant end.") (emphasis added).
181. Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy, FCC
OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING WORKING PAPER SERIES 29 (1997) (quoted in JERRY KANG,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 242 (2001)).
182. DAVID B. WHITTLE, CYBERSPACE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 13 (1997).
183. See Kenneth J. Brown, Assessing the Legitimacy of Governmental Regulation of
Modern Speech Aimed at Social Reform: The Importance of Hindsight and Causation, 10 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 459 (2002) (advocating that government re-assess the imminent lawless
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more interactive than virtually any other mass communication
medium, the Internet can also be the most impersonal of all media.
18 4
The decentralization and anonymity of the Internet might cause
some to believe that criminal libel should be regulated more
stringently online than offline. Anonymity poses a problem for the
traditional "marketplace of ideas" because the recipient, not knowing
the author's identity, has a difficult time "evaluating the quality and
significance of the writing."'18 5 In the Ian Lake incident, residents of
Beaver County overreacted in part because they did not know who
had created the Web pages in question, and they apparently feared
that the caustic critic might also be a killer. Similarly,
decentralization could be the basis for some officials' belief that
Internet libels are materially different than non-Internet libels.
Because there is no "single centralized point from which individual
Web sites or services can be blocked from the Web[,]"' 86 taking down
an alleged libel-and pursuing its source-might prove forbidding.
Also, the belief that "anything goes" on the Internet could lead
Internet speakers to more freely engage in speech that threatens or
incites lawless action, and that speech could be more widely and
quickly received. 
187
Decentralization and anonymity, however, are not closely
enough related to the government's interests to justify medium-based
regulation. Decentralization does not in practice prevent the
government from serving its interests in preventing breaches of the
peace and revolution. Internet Service Providers control at least their
portion of the Internet. In the case of Lake, like other recent Internet
criminal libel defendants, law enforcement authorities subpoenaed an
ISP and received a response almost immediately. 88 If proven, the
assertion that the Internet is a haven for anti-government types might
be closely related to the government's interests in preventing breaches
of the peace and revolution. However, a government regulatory
regime aimed at controlling Internet speech in order to prevent
action test of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) because the Internet permits speakers
advocating criminal action to reach wide audiences instantaneously).
184. WHITTLE, supra note 182, at 49 (noting that a communications medium is impersonal
when its messages "[o]riginate from a source without the individual awareness of the
recipient").
185. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 n.5 (1995).
186. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'dby Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
187. See Brown, supra note 183.
188. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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physical conflict would almost certainly not be narrowly tailored.
Because "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought[,]'1 89 regulating the entire Internet in order to target anti-
government types will also result in the regulation of legitimate, non-
violent protest groups and social movement organizations.
1 90
Anonymity is not closely related to the government's interest in
prosecuting Internet criminal libels. Anonymity has long been a
tradition of our nation's system of free expression. Mark Twain and
0. Henry are both pseudonyms for writers who preferred not to use
their real names, 191 and anonymous written communication has long
been an integral part of self-governing societies.192 Fear of retaliation
or ostracism, in Lake's case, was a plausible reason not to attach his
name to his comments. 93 In the United States, at least, "the interest
in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure
as a condition of entry.' 94
B. Low Entry Barriers and Wide Reach
The Internet makes the equivalent of a printing press available to
almost anyone for a fraction of the cost. 195 In doing so, the Internet
makes reaching a large and widespread audience relatively easy to do.
However, economic barriers are not the only things the Internet
breaks down; the Internet also allows writers to avoid the editorial
controls typically in place before publication. 196  Additionally, the
Internet is unlike traditional print or broadcast media in that messages
can have a long shelf life-an Internet message can circulate via e-
189. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (1997) (citation omitted).
190. See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the
First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 125 (2001) (noting the
presence on the Internet of organized groups focusing on homosexual rights, disability rights,
environmentalism, and property rights, among others).
191. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 n.4 (1995).
192. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
193. Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42 ("Despite readers' curiosity and the public's interest in
identifying the creator of a work of art, an author generally is free to decide whether or not to
disclose his or her true identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear
of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to
preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.").
194. Id. at 342.
195. See Kreimer, supra note 190, at 124 ("Access to the Internet lowers the cost of
producing and disseminating information and argument, and hence the capital required to enter
public dialogue.").
196. Id. at 126 ("The Web allows insurgent groups to make available a volume of
information that could not conceivably have been carried by national media outlets.").
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mail or remain posted somewhere even long after the message's
creator has tried to retract it. 197
Among all the characteristics of the Internet, however, the
reduced barriers, wide reach, long shelf life, and instantaneous nature
of the Internet are the least likely to justify medium-based regulation.
A speaker who uses the Internet should not be penalized because his
chosen medium is effective in that it reaches many people over a long
period of time. If the wide reach and long shelf life of the Internet are
relevant at all in a defamation action, they speak to damages and not
injury. In a political system where "it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope, and imagination[,]" and where the preferred response
to speech with which one disagrees is to express one's own point of
view rather than trying to suppress someone else's, 98 the Internet not
only lowers barriers and widens the reach of alleged libels, but also
does the same for the responses of those who were allegedly libeled.
Scholars have suggested that, in light of the Internet's facilitation of
responses to alleged libels, civil defamation law should be recast to
require "that the opportunity for reply be taken advantage of in lieu of
monetary compensation. ' 99  Likewise, in the context of criminallibel, replies should replace prosecutions.2 °0
V. CONCLUSION
Criminal libel is an anachronistic doctrine that was in decline
before certain state prosecutors began reviving it in the context of
Internet speech. Those states' attempts, however, to apply the law of
criminal libel to the Internet-without prosecuting the thousands of
criminal libels that occur daily in the non-Internet world-fail the test
for medium-based regulation. States may not regulate speech on the
Internet differently than they regulate non-Internet speech without
197. See Gribbin, supra note 145 (quoting a New York lawyer who said that Internet
retractions are largely ineffective because "[i]f I send you something, and you delete and trash it,
it's still on the Internet somewhere").
198. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating "the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones" and thereby demonstrating the commitment to
encouraging those who disagree with certain speech to answer with their own speech rather than
trying to suppress the original speech).
199. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1382 (1996).
200. An additional reason for not punishing libel on the Internet as a crime is that the
Internet breaks down geographic boundaries that provide legitimacy and notice for a state's
criminal laws. See id. at 1369-70. For example, a resident of California who publishes an
Internet message from California that is accessible in Utah would not expect his conduct to be
regulated by Utah's criminal libel law. See id.
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first showing that the unique characteristics of the Internet are closely
related to the state's interest. In the case of criminal libel, the states
seek to prevent breaches of the peace and to prevent criticism of the
government. Those interests are not closely related to the
characteristics--decentralization, anonymity, counter-cultural
character, speed, low entry barriers, long shelf life, and wide reach-
that make the Internet unique.
